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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040877-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
is ik * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for three counts of securities fraud, second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004); one count of sale of an 
unregistered security, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (West 
2004); one count of sale of a security by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3(1), (2) (West 2004); and one count of 
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1601 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Deno Himonas presiding. This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 (a). May defendant agree to one definition of "willfully" at trial, and then challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence under a different definition on appeal? 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a claim of invited error. Invited error claims 
arise for the first time on appeal, so no standard of review applies. 
1 (b). Was there sufficient evidence of defendant's willful omission of material facts 
in the sale of a security where defendant failed to disclose that (1) he had not investigated the 
legitimacy of the security; (2) he had declared bankruptcy a few years earlier; and (3) one of 
the principal managers of the investment scheme had a prior felony conviction? 
Standard of Review. Defendant did not preserve this claim in the trial court. He thus 
raises it under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence when it placed defendant on 
probation for 144 months? 
Standard of Review. Defendant did not object in the trial court to his sentence. His 
claim, however, concerns the legality of his sentence, which may be raised at any time. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). This court may therefore review it for correctness. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES1 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004), attached as Addendum A; 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (West 2004), attached as Addendum B; 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (West 2004), attached as Addendum C; 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (West 2004), Attached as Addendum D; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004), attached as Addendum E. 
For the sake of convenience, the State cites to the 2004 versions of the relevant 
statutes, which are identical in all material respects to the versions applicable to defendant. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged defendant with racketeering and with various violations of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, including securities fraud, selling securities without a license, and 
selling unregistered securities (R. 1-9,169-73). A three-day trial was held (R. 412-14). On 
the second day of trial, at the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the 
case for lack of jurisdiction because the State did not prove that the crimes occurred in Salt 
Lake County (R. 413:337). The court determined that location was not an element of the 
Securities Act violations and that the question of which county the crime was charged in was 
one of venue, not jurisdiction (R. 413:338-39). Accordingly, the court ruled that it had 
jurisdiction and denied the motion (R. 413:334-35). The next day, the jury returned guilty 
verdicts for all counts (R. 363-64; 414:456-57). 
The court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms for each count (R. 381; 
415:10-11). The court then suspended the prison terms, placed defendant on probation for 
144 months, imposed $626,000 in restitution, and barred defendant from acting as a fiduciary 
or participating in any real estate transactions except for purchasing or selling a personal 
residence (R. 381,415:11-12). Defendant obtained new counsel and filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 390). He now claims for the first time that the State failed to introduce sufficient 
evidence that his violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act were willful. See Br. Aplt. at 
21. He also claims for the first time that his 144-month probation violates Utah law. Id. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between September 2000 and March 2001, defendant purchased at least three homes 
in the state of Utah (R. 412:103, 105, 116-17, 148,158,180-81; 194, 201; State's Ex. No. 
11, 17, 20-22, 26, 29-30). In an addendum to the real estate purchase contract, he 
conditioned the purchase of each home on the seller agreeing to a Placement Agreement 
under which a portion of the proceeds of the sale would be reinvested in the attorney trust 
account of Clay Harrison at Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund (R. 412:86, 149-51, 182-83; 
State's Ex. No. 11,, 14,21,29). The account would purportedly pay interest to the seller at 
a fixed rate for two years and then return the principal to the seller (R. 412:86,149-51,182-
83; State's Ex. No. 11, , 14, 21, 29). The account supposedly generated enough interest to 
pay not just the seller's interest, but also to pay the buyer's mortgage payments (R. 413:361). 
Recruiting home owners to invest the proceeds of the sale of their homes in a trust 
account was part of "The Program" (R. 413:360-61). Defendant learned of The Program 
from Al Anderson and Paul Stewart (R. 413:371). Stewart claimed to be able to earn 
commissions by facilitating money transfers from banks with surplus cash reserves to banks 
with insufficient cash reserves (R. 413:371-72). To facilitate the transfer, however, Stewart 
asserted that he needed to have a certain amount of money on deposit with the bank (R. 
413:372). He claimed to use the trust account money to facilitate the bank transfers and paid 
interest to the trust account beneficiaries from his commissions (R. 413:471-72). 
Without performing any investigation, defendant decided to participate in The 
Program (R. 413:372). He observed that after eighteen months with The Program, Stewart 
4 
and Anderson had all the trappings of success (R. 413:373-74). Defendant concluded that 
The Program must therefore be legitimate (R. 413:372). However, The Program was not 
registered as a security, nor was defendant licensed to sell securities (R. 413:335; State's Ex. 
No. 1-3). Moreover, the trust account's escrow agent, L. Dale McAllister, was helping 
Stewart to embezzle the trust account funds (R. 413:284,189-90). The Program was, in fact, 
a Ponzi scheme that inevitably collapsed, leaving those who sold their homes to defendant 
with nothing (R. 412:128; 163, 203-05, 289-91).2 
Richard Van Roo 
Defendant's first victim was Richard Van Roo (R. 412:81). Van Roo was asking 
$449,000 for his home in Layton (R. 412:82, 85). Van Roo's agent, Dan Stansbury, brought 
him an offer from defendant for the full asking price, but with some "unusual terms" (R. 
412:83, 85; State's Ex. No. 10). The addendum to the real estate purchase contract (REPC) 
bound both parties to a "Placement Agreement" (R. 412:88; State's Ex. No. 10). It stated 
that $205,000 of the $449,000 sale price would go into an escrow account with Attorney's 
Title Guarantee Fund and would remain there for twenty-four months, after which the buyer 
would pay a balloon payment to the seller of the principal plus 8.25% interest (R. 412:86, 
88-89, State's Ex. No. 10). The addendum also stated that Van Roo would pay defendant's 
closing costs up to $15,000 (R. 412:88; State's Ex. No. 10). Paragraph two of the placement 
agreement stated, "Funds will be keep [sic] in an escrow account at Attorney's Title Guaranty 
2
 A Ponzi scheme is an investment program that uses money from later investors to 
pay earnings to earlier investors (R. 413:373). 
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Fund, Inc., Title Officer, L. Dale McAllister, until the end of the time duration. Funds will 
be kept safe and unencumbered and can only be moved out the account with the [seller's 
approval." (R. 412:89; State's ex. No. 10). 
Van Roo was uncomfortable with the agreement and sought several opinions before 
signing it (R. 412:93). He first discussed it with his own real estate agent, Stansbury, and the 
owner of Brough Realty, Steven Brough (R. 412:89). He also spoke with the vice-president 
of his bank, his tax advisor at H & R Block, an employee of Washington Mutual, which 
carried the mortgage on his home, and an attorney (R. 412:93-94). Everybody said that the 
agreement appeared legitimate and that Van Roo's money should be safe because it would be 
held by a title company (R. 412:94). Van Roo understood that money in an escrow account 
was "sacred" and was as safe as in a bank (R. 412:89). 
Van Roo was still uncomfortable, so a meeting was arranged with defendant, Dan 
Stansbury, Calvin Udy, who was defendant's real estate agent, and Al Anderson (R. 412:97). 
Defendant explained the transaction to Van Roo (R. 412:97). When Van Roo asked 
questions, Anderson stepped in and answered them (R. 412:97,99). Anderson explained that 
he was teaching defendant "the business" (R. 412:97). Van Roo asked how the trust account 
earned interest, and Anderson explained, "[W]hat we do is we can get loans based on this 
money that is in the escrow account and we can get better interest on that money that we're 
paying you and therefore we can pay you from the difference in that interest" (R. 412:99). 
When Van Roo pressed Anderson further to explain how loans were obtained using the trust 
6 
money, Anderson stated, "[I]f we told you that then you'd be doing it too, wouldn't you, and 
we'd be out of business" (R. 412:99-100). 
Ultimately, Van Roo decided to accept defendant's offer (R. 412:105; State's Ex. No. 
13). He signed a real estate purchase agreement with an addendum similar to the addendum 
attached to the original offer (R. 412:121; State's Ex. No. 10-11). The new addendum 
required defendant to return half the principal at the first year and to make monthly interest 
payments (R. 412:98). The new Placement Agreement removed Attorney's Title Guarantee 
Fund as the repository of the escrow funds and replaced it with the Law Office of Clay 
Harrison (R. 412:121; State's Ex. 10-11). Defendant did not tell Van Roo that Attorney's 
Title Guarantee Fund had asked that its name be removed from the Placement Agreement (R. 
413:367). 
Before closing, defendant visited Van Roo's home (R. 412:113-14). Van Roo 
expressed concern about the investment because the house represented his life savings (R. 
412:108). Defendant assured him that his money was safe and said, "I can personally 
guarantee that" (R. 412:108). Defendant did not explain, however, the risk that someone 
might abscond with the money in the trust account (R. 412:108). He also failed to disclose 
several facts concerning The Program and those who administered it, including that (1) 
defendant had declared bankruptcy in 1998; (2) Anderson had pled guilty to felony theft by 
deception in March of 1986; (3) Stewart had received a cease-and-desist order from the Utah 
Division of Securities in March of 2000; and (4) a lawsuit had been filed against Attorney's 
7 
Title Guarantee Fund, Paul Stewart, and L. Dale McAllister concerning a real estate 
transaction in Duchesne County (R. 412:107-08; State's Ex. No. 5-7, 9). 
At closing, on September 11,2000, the HUD settlement statement showed that, after 
closing costs and repayment of the mortgage on the home, Van Roo had $233,510.78 in 
equity in the home that was due to him (R. 412:117. State's Ex. No. 17). Van Roo received a 
check for $28,510.78, and the balance of $205,000 was deposited in Clay Harrison's trust 
account (R. 412:118; State's Ex. No. 16, 18). 
After closing, Van Roo received regular monthly interest payments for seven months 
(R. 412:124-127). Some of the payments were personal checks from defendant (R. 
412:124-27; State's Ex. No. 19). Others were business checks from Account Enterprises, 
Inc. (R. 412:124-27, State's Ex. No. 19). Two checks from Account Enterprises, Inc. 
bounced, but defendant sent replacement checks drawn on his personal account (R. 412:124-
25; State's Ex. No. 19) In July of 2001 Van Roo did not receive an interest payment (R. 
412:127-28). He tried to contact defendant and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund (R. 
412:128). Defendant eventually returned Van Roo's telephone calls, but Van Roo never 
received any more interest payments or the $205,000 principal he invested in The Program 
(R. 412:128). 
David Fernau 
David Fernau owned half of a duplex in Midway (R. 412:145-46). He listed the 
property for sale in 2000 and got an offer from defendant for the full asking price, $315,000 
(R. 148). The offer included the same terms as the offer to Van Roo, including a 
8 
requirement to deposit a portion of the sale proceeds in Harrison's trust account (R. 
412:149-50). Fernau accepted the offer and signed the real estate purchase contract on 
September 19, 2000 (R. 412:151; State's Ex. No. 20-21). 
Defendant did not discuss the terms of the investment with Fernau, but rather, left that 
to Fernau's real estate agent, Greg Daniels (R. 412:152-54). Defendant did not disclose his 
own bankruptcy, Anderson's felony conviction, the lawsuit, the cease-and-desist order, or 
the risk that someone might abscond with the trust funds (R. 412:155-56). Such information 
would have changed Femau's decision to accept defendant's offer (R. 412:156). The 
placement agreement contained the same promise that the funds would remain safe and 
unencumbered in McAllister's trust account (State's Ex. No. 21). 
At closing, on October 18, 2000, Fernau had $282,455.25 in equity in his home (R. 
412:158-59; State's Ex. No. 22). Most of the equity, $220,000, was deposited in Harrison's 
trust account (R. 412:159). The balance was paid to Fernau (R. 412:159 State's Ex. No. 24). 
Fernau's interest payments were scheduled to be paid in lump sums with partial repayments 
of the principal at the end of each of the two years of investment (R. 412:150-51; State'sEx. 
No. 23). However, near the end of the first year, just before the first payment was due, 
defendant contacted Fernau and told him the that trust money had been stolen (R. 412:163). 
Fernau never received the interest or the $220,000 he invested in The Program (R. 412:163). 
Sidney Creer 
Sidney Creer owned a townhouse in Midway that she listed for sale in 1999 (R. 
412:177). In early 2001, her real estate agent brought her an offer from defendant for her 
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asking price, $315,000 (R. 412:181; State's Ex. No. 26). The offer included the same terms: 
that she place $200,000 of the sale proceeds into McAllister's trust account (R. 412:182; 
State's Ex. No. 26). Creer liked to work with investors and was thus open to defendant's 
proposal because she felt that investors were "not emotional" (R. 412:183). 
Creer compiled a list of questions for defendant and discussed the transaction with 
him over the phone (R. 412:185-88). Defendant explained that the trust money was used to 
obtain low interest loans (R. 412:186). He also stated that the escrow officer, Dale 
McAllister, was ethical and "above board" because he was "paid well" (R. 412:187). 
Defendant did not explain to Creer the risk that someone might abscond with the trust money 
(R. 412:191). He also never disclosed his own bankruptcy, Anderson's felony conviction, 
the lawsuit, or the cease-and-desist order (R. 412:191-92). Defendant further did not tell 
Creer that two checks Anderson had issued to Van Roo in December had bounced (R. 
412:192). After speaking with defendant and discussing the transaction with an attorney, 
Creer made a counteroffer with substantially similar terms, which defendant accepted (R. 
412:192-93; State's Ex. No. 28-29). 
In October of 2001, Creer learned from her former neighbor in Midway that other 
sellers had not received their money (R. 412:202). She contacted defendant, who apologized 
and claimed he was trying to raise money to pay her (R. 412:203). Creer never received any 
interest payments or the $200,000 she invested in The Program (R. 412:203). 
10 
The Trial 
Defendant testified at trial (R. 413:348). He admitted that he did not disclose his own 
bankruptcy or Anderson's felony conviction, but claimed he was unaware that the law 
required him to do so (R. 413:367-68). He also asserted that he did not know that the 
investment was fraudulent, that a cease-and-desist order had been issued, or that a lawsuit 
had been filed (R. 413:369, 371-73). He claimed that he told each of the victims of the risk 
that the individuals with access to the trust account might abscond with the trust funds (R. 
413:352). 
Before the start of the second day of trial, the parties met with the court outside the 
presence of the jury to discuss the jury instructions (R. 413:220). Defendant has not 
included a transcript of those discussions in the record on appeal, nor has he otherwise 
attempted to reconstruct what occurred during those discussions. Defendant proposed an 
instruction that stated that misrepresentations under the securities fraud statute must be made 
"for the purpose of defrauding investors" and that "good faith and honest purpose on the part 
of any defendant is an absolute defense as to this charge" (R. 213). The instruction bears a 
handwritten notation indicating that it was withdrawn (R. 213). The instruction does not 
appear in the court's final instructions (R. 303-361; 213:376-404). 
Defendant also proposed an instruction that stated, "An act committed or an omission 
made under an ignorance of mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a 
defense for that crime" (R. 161). The instruction further stated, "Thus a person is not guilty 
of a crime if he commits an act or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the 
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existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would make such act or omission 
lawful" (R. 161). The second half of the instruction was crossed out, and the first half, 
regarding ignorance or mistake of fact, was included in the court's final instructions (R. 342; 
413:297). 
The only instruction proposed by the State regarding willfulness stated the following: 
A defendant acts willfully if it was his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result—not that it was the defendant's conscious 
desire or objective to violated the law, nor that the defendant knew that he was 
committing fraud in the sale of the security 
(R. 255). That instruction was included in the court's final instructions (R. 335; 413:39). At 
the close of the State's case, the parties again discussed the jury instructions with the court 
(R. 413:345). At the end of the discussion, defense counsel told the court that he had no 
objections to the instructions (R. 413:346). 
In closing arguments, the prosecutor pointed out that The Program, on its face, did not 
make much sense (R. 414:412). She noted that the holder of a trust account does not make 
any interest off the account and that the theory that Stewart was earning commissions with 
the trust money by using it to transfer funds between banks was implausible (R. 414:412). 
The prosecutor then argued that defendant misrepresented the integrity of the investment 
when he told the sellers that their money would not be encumbered and would stay in the 
Attorney's Title trust account (R. 414:422). She also argued that defendant omitted material 
facts when he failed to disclose his own bankruptcy, Anderson's felony conviction, the 
cease-and-desist order, and the lawsuit against Attorney's Title (R. 414:422-25). The 
prosecutor acknowledged, "Mr. Wallace may say, I didn't know that" (R 414:424). She 
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argued, however, that defendant had a duty to discover those facts (R. 414:424). The 
prosecutor asserted, "Well, if you're going to sell a security to somebody, you'd better find 
o u t . . . it's not buyer beware" (R. 414:422). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's claim that the evidence is insufficient is really a hybrid claim in which he 
argues for a different definition of willfulness than was given in the jury instructions and 
then claims that, under his new definition, the evidence of willfulness was insufficient. At 
trial, however, defendant did not object to the instruction defining "willfully" and, in fact, 
told the court he had no objection to the instruction. Defendant thus invited any error in the 
definition of willfully, and this Court should refuse to consider his arguments for a different 
definition than was given at trial. It should review his sufficiency claim only under the 
definition of "willfully" used at trial. 
Even if this Court were to excuse defendant's waiver, it should still apply the 
definition of "willfully" used at trial, because that definition is correct. "Willfully," in the 
context of securities fraud, does not require intent to defraud or intent to violate the law. It 
also does not require actual knowledge that the statement is false or misleading. It is 
sufficient that defendant meant to speak the false or misleading statement and that he could 
have discovered with reasonable diligence that the statement was false or misleading. 
Under the correct definition of "willfully," the evidence is sufficient. Defendant 
represented to the victims that The Program was a legitimate investment. He did not, 
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however, disclose that he had done nothing to verify its legitimacy, nor did he disclose that 
he had declared bankruptcy only a few years earlier. He also knew but failed to disclose that 
(1) one of the principal managers of The Program had previously been convicted of a felony; 
(2) Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund had ordered its name removed from the closing 
documents, and (3) the FBI was investigating The Program. 
Because defendant did not investigate the legitimacy of The Program, he did not 
know about the cease-and-desist order from the Utah Division of Securities or the lawsuit 
that had been filed against Stewart, McAllister, and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund. Both 
documents are, however, a public record, and defendant could have easily found them had he 
contacted the courts or the Utah Division of Securities. Because defendant failed to perform 
any investigation of The Program, his omission of the lawsuit and the cease and desist order 
was willful. 
POINT II 
Defendant asserts that the 144-month probation term he acquiesced to at 
sentencing violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). That statute does not restrict the 
trial court's authority grant defendant probation for term longer than thirty-six months. It 
only authorizes the trial court release an offender from his probation if he completes a 
thirty-six month term without violation. 
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AKf.'UMKNi' 
I. DEFENDANT MAY NOT AGREE TO ONE DEFINITION OF 
"WILLFULLY59 AT TRIAL, AND THEN CHALLENGE THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE UNDER * DIFFERENT 
DEFINITION ON APPEAI • 
^ Pendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he acted willfmh !:i 
violating the various provisions of ihc l-mii Unilonn Securities Act. ilK> ^'mai .- * -i. 
claim in which he iirst aniues for a definition of the Aoia "^wilfull)" that is different luni 
ihat charged lo the jury. Br \pll. at ??.. 33. 36-38. Tie then argues that under his now 
d c U ; ,•; ! . ; . _ . _ . _ , • . . u i K 
Defenda nt " a: iiue the ^uiiiuene)' of the evidence under a deilniiioii oi the 
word "willfully" that he did not assert at tria1 ~ 'hen he may only challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence under ;,.». w*. .wntWiii " .. . . .,. agieed 1.0 in the jury instructions 
Uetendant approved the trial court s definition of "willfully"; lie 
cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence under a 
different definition of "willfully." 
P t..., . * LLIUII or the failure t •- - e an instruction, the instruction 
in a; ..-> :x assigned .1- error except to avoid * mifest injustice," This *uu. s 
complemented by the doctrine of invited error. See State 1 > I i1 i 1/11 liltoi i9 2003 IJ 1 zzy j :) 4 1 
P 3 ::l 111 ;c[I]fcoi msel, either b> statement or act, affirnutiw'v "presented to the court that 
he or she had no objection lo the i un instruction, we will not review the instruction under the 
manifest injustice exceptu ••. imvi f counsel iiierely fails to propose or to obj ect to an 
instruction, the propriety of the instruction is reviewable only for manifest injustice. If, 
however, counsel expresses approval of the instructions, then invited error applies and this 
Court may not review the propriety of the instruction. 
Defendant does not claim error in the jury instructions. His construction of the word 
"willfully" on appeal, however, is essentially a Trojan horse-style attack on the jury 
instructions. He attempts, in effect, to circumvent the manifest injustice and invited error 
doctrines as they relate to jury instructions by arguing a new definition of the word 
"willfully" under the guise of an insufficient evidence claim. 
At trial, defendant proposed a jury instruction that requires the jury to find that he 
acted "for the purpose of defrauding investors" (R. 213). The instruction also states that 
"good faith and an honest purpose on the part of any defendant is an absolute defense to this 
charge" (R. 213). There is no discussion of the instruction in the record, and the judge's note 
on the instruction indicates that defendant withdrew it (R. 213). 
The trial court defined "willfully" in jury instruction number thirty-five as a 
"conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result" (R. 335). The 
instruction also stated that "willfully" does not mean "it was the defendant's conscious desire 
or objective to violate the law, nor that the defendant knew that he was committing fraud in 
Defendant claims "the trial judge rejected [his] requests" for "'good faith' and 
'honest' belief in the legitimacy of the Program." Br. Aplt. at 40 (quoting R. 231, 214). 
The record does not support his assertion. The record contains no discussion of the 
instruction, and the instruction itself bears a note from Judge Himonas that the instruction 
was withdrawn, not rejected (R. 213). 
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fort\ >ne that "jajii <tu committed or an omission made under an icmorance or mistake of 
fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense for that crime" (R. 342), 
' I he jury instr actions contained no further definition c i explanation : f the \ > • : i :i 
"willfi ill) "4 A fter disci issing ob jections to the j • * — - * *—;nL: .; -eees ; defendant 
told the court that he had no further objections to the instructions (R. 413:346), 
in
.nt now attempts to resurrect the d^iui^iw. -u ^-.-uK ,iwn ue withdrew at 
tr I Ml "n ill ill nil I-I mi i n 11 iii« Ih ml 1i : 
wiilflilly failed to do so." Br. Aplt. at 36-37. He also asserts the evidence was insufficient 
because it "proves [his] good faith beliefs and honesty" and proves that he didn't believe he 
"willfully" requires knowledge that one's action violate the law and that good faith is a 
complete defense. • 
Defendant's argument on appeal mai;, good :„,.:. .o_ .. ... *._ ....a;.>.w 
defense is ^ro . - - tn • • :. • \ r ^vn^ of ignorance * :-- *••} c *^:iei thai nc 
agreed to at irkr i he first connotes a correct understanding of the facts but a mistake of 
law. ' I lie second connotes a correct understanding ,.; . , . , „i a ^;siuke v.; KK 
Jiistniction i i i t w w o p i o w u e u inesuuuiuiv uciiinilui;> v i l iucihiundm. KHUU UI^M. 
and recklessly (R. 356). But it expressly applied those definition^ «^u to \\u* m^r^ -en 
element of racketeering in instruction number forty-nine (R. 356). 
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instruction that reasonable mistake or ignorance of fact is a defense and that intent to violate 
the law is not an element of willfulness, defendant invited the error he now complains about 
on appeal. 
Defendant further claims for first time on appeal that "willfully" also requires actual 
knowledge that material information was omitted or that a statement was false or misleading. 
Br. Aplt at 23. Actual knowledge is not always a component of willfulness. As explained 
in point LB.3, "willfully," in the securities fraud context, goes only to the person's intent to 
say or not to say certain words. The question of knowledge of the false or misleading nature 
of the words is a separate issue. Court's have predicated a person's knowledge of the falsity 
or incompleteness of his statements on recklessness, negligence, or intentional ignorance. 
See infra, pt. LB.3. At trial, defendant agreed that "willfully" is adequately defined as a 
"conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result" (R. 335; 
413:356). His affirmative representation that the "willfully" instruction was adequate 
without any explanation of knowledge constitutes invited error and precludes him from 
redefining "willfully" on appeal. 
Defendant's definition of "willfully" is an attempt to circumvent the manifest injustice 
and invited error doctrines as they relate to jury instructions by arguing a new definition of 
the word "willfully" under the guise of an insufficient evidence claim. He cannot approve 
one definition of "willfully" at trial, and then assert a different definition on appeal. See 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54 ("[I]f counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, we will not 
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assert an insufficient evidence claim based on a different construction of the substantive 
criminal statute than was given at trial, this Court should require him to first su.ccessful.ly 
chajiuigcinejuryinstrucljon1;. * Hhciwisc, pailies m;i\ \fmllt ii» final h} "inidimng^K'ni <>« 
affirmatr :rely *mnr< « ii ia the ji n*> instructions,, and then asserting a claim of insufficient 
evidence based on a different construction of the substantive criminal statute than w as 
approved in the =.,.;-; infractions. See Kemeth^r \ , ^insylvania Inter•scholastic Athletic 
*• •• • • 6 9 8 6 .l,ii,,|: 1 ' ' 1 • 1 1 * • 1 :' (E I) Pi i filed No\ 8 1999), 1999 WL 
1012957 (unpublished memorandum and order) ("PIAA has waived its right to point to the 
niry instruction ~~ n source o f crr^ r ^ ^nnnot circumvent its wniwi > a'jumg 
omitted)). 
Because defendant withdrew his own jury instructions and approved the instructions 
as given, ueien^. p . . . - . : • > . . :.: -J ;* "• . . 
This Court should 'therefore disregard defendant's construction of the word "willfully" and 
consider the sufficiency of the evidence only under the definition, provided in, the ji lry 
instructions. Ken if this I uuii were lucvcusc ilclcinlaiil s n,nui l ium\u, i( ilmiiM Mill 
review the sufficiency of the evidence under the definition of "willfully" used at trial, 
because that definition is, in, fact, correct, 
B. The trial court correctly defined "willfully/' as a voluntary act that 
does not require an intent to violate the law or an intent to defraud, 
1. This Court should construe "willfully" in harmony with other 
states that have adopted the Uniform Securities Act. 
Utah has adopted the Uniform Securities Actof 1956. See Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1 
through 61-1-30 (West 2004). The exact meaning of the word "willfully" in the Uniform 
Securities Act, however, is a subject of some dispute. Compare Unif. Securities Act 1956 § 
409, U.L.A. Secur § 409, Notes of Decisions 6; Joseph C. Long, 12A Blue Sky Law §§ 
10:65-10:69 (2004); Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, 25 Securities Practice: Federal 
and State Enforcement § 7:5 (2d ed. 2001); Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required 
for a Criminal Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Bus. Law. 35,36-37 (1996); Jed 
S. Rakoff, "Willful" Intent in Criminal Securities Cases, 5/11/95 N.Y.L.J. 3; Robert F. 
Koets, What Constitutes 'Willfulness" for Purposes of Criminal Provisions of Federal 
Securities Laws, 136 A.L.R. Fed. 457 (1997). 
In construing the word "willfully" in the securities act, this Court should consider the 
Legislature's intent in adopting the Uniform Securities Act and the Utah Supreme Court's 
prior interpretations of the Act. The Legislature has stated that the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act should be "construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of 
those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Additionally, the 
Utah Supreme Court, in construing the willfulness requirement in State v. Larsen, noted that 
section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act resembles section 17(a)(2) of the 
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Icderal Securities Ael oil I'M \ Imi n.pl.niu HI Ilui (In I cmisLilliin diii mil itiUnit In him I lln 
state to federal constructions of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts. See State v. Larsen, 8o;5 
P.2d 1355, 1359 (Utah 1993); see also Unit Securities X ! P c r 5 ^ L ! T T .A. *:r;v ° 1A1 
(noting that section 101, the unifoi m la\ v i ^..ei, . . . . . . .: 
Secii i! ities and Exchange Commission's! i lie 10b 5, which was modeled upon section I 
of the Securities act of 1933). Ilius, this Court should seek to construe section 61 -1 -
uniformly w ith other state court, rulings and should give some consideration *o ^uv/ai 
P.2datl360. 
2, "Willfully" in the Uniform Securities Act does not rcqiiiit1 
intent to violate the law or intent to defraud. 
context and purposes of the statute or rule at issue.*" (7/\ sn v I urncr. 2000 IJI' ^45 \ 1 *\ 4 
P.3d 789. The State alleged uudei subsection ». < . : the securities naud statute that 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading." Utah Code Ann, £ 61-1 -1 (2). Utah Code Ann. §61-
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Larsen, that willfully in the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act does not require an intent to violate the law. Larsen was convicted of eighteen 
Lar s!( '?i, 865 P 2d a 11 357 "I arsen's criminal acts included his failure to inform investors of 
material information related to the company, misrepresentations of material facts regarding 
the company's financial status, and related acts of dishonesty." Id. On appeal, Larsen 
asserted that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that a criminal violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2) requires intent to defraud and that "good faith constitutes a 
complete defense to a charge of securities fraud." Id. 
The supreme court held that when the word willful in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 is 
applied to a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2), it does not require scienter, i.e. "the 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358. Nor does it require an 
intent to "violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage." Id. at 1358 n.3. 
Rather, it only requires a "'desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.'" Id. at 1360 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103). "To act willfully in this context means to act 
deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or inadvertently." 
Id. at I35&n3;see also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149,1153 (Utah App. 1994) ("[A] finding 
of specific intent is not a prerequisite for a conviction under section 61-1-1(2).. . ."). 
The holding of the supreme court in Larsen is consistent with the overwhelming 
weight of authority from other jurisdictions. See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 
351-52 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that violation of Securities and Exchange Rule 10b-5, on 
which Uniform Securities Act was modeled, does not require specific intent to defraud or 
knowledge of law); United States v. Koenig, 388 F.Supp. 670, 711 (S.D.N. Y. 1974) (ruling 
that willfulness is not a question of specific intent, but rather, whether defendants "actually 
know that the representations were misleading or that material facts were omitted, or did 
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. .\ ! . . - . ; / ; • r con lpleteness of the fa cts represented"); Bayhi i " St ; '/< ? , 
629 So.2d782, "^ (AlaCrim. App. 199 'l H^  "Knowledge that the act violates the securities 
law:*. (»r that the instrument in question is a security, is not relevant."); State v. Montgomery, 
. . v v • .v i-.upung, lor purpose oJ securities vjolaln HI, 1:1 niunal UHJI; 
the omission referred to ' " and not an "'intent to violate the law, or to injure another,, or to 
acquire any advantage" (quoting I.C, § 18 1 01(1 ))); 1 }et iple v., Whitlow , 43,3 N.E.2d 629, 
N.E.2d 501, 508 (Ind. 1985) (noting that "on.h w /nt necessary is the intent to commit 
actions proscribed by the statutes"); State v. Rihandeneira, 817 P.2d 11n4r 1116 11 n fVnv> 
ecd OiAi) be aware ui what he was doing); State v. Tries, 337 N.W.2d 398, -i-Ji 
(Neb. 1983) ("Specific intent need not lx- pnncn lo sustain a oomico u wide1 the fraud 
Cl. App. jJiv. iy Iz.) ^holdinc \u:\i "a specific criminal intent, an evil motive, or knowledge 
that the law was being violated is not required in order to find a criminal violation o? -he 
N ew J ersey Securities I -aw' ); State v. Ross, ; 15 I 2< 1 II ' ; I I ; • I ( 1 J" 1 1 C l \ pp 15 86) 
(holding that wniiuiness does not require specific intent); Tanner v. State Corporation 
Commission. 574 S.F.2d 52^, 530 ('Va. 2003) ('holding ;•• scienter requirement in 
auinhiijtrative ucLi^  .; . . .VVIU.«IK\M;UUO .m Li^t.uUnics Willjulne^ MW / irposes of 
American Saving Bank F.S.B. v. UBSPainewebberlnc, 250 F.Supp2d 1254,1258 (D. Haw. 
2003) (holding that civil action under Hawaii securities fraud statute requires showing of 
scienter); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821,826-27 (Alaska 1980) (holding that willfulness in 
securities fraud requires awareness that conduct is wrong); Hubardv. HibbardBrown & Co., 
633 A.2d 345, 349 (Del. 1993) (holding that civil action under Delaware securities law 
requires showing of scienter); State v. Markham, 697 P.2d 263,269 (Wash Ct. App. 1985) 
(noting that knowledge of securities laws is not required, but specific intent to defraud, 
mislead, or deceive is). 
Thus, to be guilty of a criminal violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-1(2), a person 
need not be aware that he is violating the securities laws or have the intent to defraud an 
investor. His misstatement or omission need only be a voluntary act, as opposed to an 
accident. Moreover, good faith is not a complete defense to securities fraud. See Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1360 n.8. 
3. "Willfully" in the Uniform Securities Act does not require 
knowledge of the falsity if defendant could have discovered the 
falsity with reasonable care. 
As explained supra point I. A., defendant never requested a jury instruction requiring 
proof of actual knowledge of the falsity before finding willful conduct. Even if he had, 
however, the trial court would properly have rejected such an instruction because "willfully," 
in the context of securities laws, does not require that a person actually know that his 




 li ilness, it left open 
the question of .whether and to what extent a person must know that his voluntary 
misstatement or omission is, in fact, a misstatement or omission. Other courts, however, 
v ! *dac o\ tiic falsity of his statement, but could have discovered the falsity with some 
investigation. For example, some courts have said that a person without actual knowledge 
acts • - (•. .,11} \\xiwi*e, "by the exercise of due diligence, [he] could have become aware of his 
omitted) see also Unin>d Stitus r \4evei\ *59 F.2d 837. J?(* <"th i r 1966K Sumc v. 
United States, 113 i s •• • • U,J. i nn .i > ^ / / i " , , . ^ . ; . i . N tv .u 
1995) ("[E]ith« . \ • . .. !. u • - • i 
criminal \iolation of [California's securities laws]."). 
Other courts have required recklessness in failing to discover the misstatement or 
• Dmission See Ebel t I ; nifei IS tates, tit it IS U i t z i :" 
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 19o4 »: People v. MnJitil, 4 J / IN. W.2d 304, 307 
(Mich, Ct App * 989); State v Temby, 322 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). 
the level of knowledge required for a willful securities violation. See United States v. Schlei, 
122 F 3d 944. Q" ;i 1 il> Cir. 1997); United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 75 (8th 
( : •. ho^e cour; s round that w il If illness could be based on deliberate ignorance if the 
evidence demonsti ated both that the defendant lacked knowledge that his statement w:\\ i-sKe 
or incomplete and that he "deliberately buried his head in the sand" to avoid discovering that 
the statement was false or incomplete. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 974 (quotations omitted). 
Imposing a lesser standard than actual knowledge is necessary to achieve the purposes 
of securities laws. The purpose of the federal securities acts, on which the Uniform 
Securities Act was modeled, was to "eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, 
abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
depression of the 1930's" Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,186 (1963). "A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, 
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus 
to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Id. at 186,194-95. 
Congress intended to impose "an affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair 
disclosure of all material facts as well as an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable care 
to avoid misleading." Id. at 194 (quotations omitted). 
States construing the Uniform Securities Act have recognized a similar purpose. "The 
primary purpose of the securities laws is to protect those who purchase securities." State v. 
Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100,102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). The statutes are "'remedial in nature and 
[were] passed to protect the inexperienced, confiding, and credulous investor, and save him 
from his own foolish cupidity.'" Id. at 103 (quoting State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911,915 
(S.D. 1979)). 
If a seller of securities knows that his ignorance of material facts precludes liability 
for failing disclose those facts, he is unlikely to thoroughly research or investigate the 
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security before se Ms 
securities laws to encourage "full and fair disclosure of all material facts" and to impose an 
:rrVrn ative obligation to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading." Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 I J.S at 19 1 (• :jii lotations omitted). • • • 
H* .J ir; 4aiit case is illustrative. Defendant admitted that before recruiting the victims 
into "i i'-L- Program.., he performed no investigation into its legi.tim.acy (R. 413:368, 372). ~ K 
saw tiiai Anderson and Stewart exhibited all the trappings of success and conclu^u ......, J* 
Program was not legitimate were blatant. Defendant knew that Attorney's Title Guarantee 
Fund had asked u nave its name removed from the placement agreement (R. 41a -^"H He 
;
 ederal Bi ireau c f In « ' estigation vv as iip 'estigal-; '* • 
413:263-64). Moreover, The Program,,, purported to pay more than i5.5°,o storest on 
unencumbered funds in a trust account, a rate far in excess of even, the most generous 
Creer that their money was safe (R. 412:108, 186-89). 
V " * -sun.'. :.i! effort. cLfendant could have discovered that the I Jtah Division of 
been filed against Paul Stewart, L. Dale McAllister, and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund (R. 
413:334,3 69-70; State's Ex. No. " -~v* Both of these items are public records that defendant 
could have discovered by coniaaing UK courts and the I ) tali DIvisioi. -i >ecur;UL:> -;. 
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before promoting it. Rather, it should require him to reasonably investigate an investment 
before promoting it to others. Such a rule would further the Securities Act's purpose of 
protecting investors by placing the burden of investigation where it belongs—on the party 
with the greatest access to information about the security. 
II. UNDER THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF "WILLFULLY"—THE 
ONE USED AT TRIAL—THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT 
A. Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
unpreserved. 
Defendant admits that he did not object to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial 
court. See Br. Aplt. at 2. He therefore argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the evidence of willfulness in his motion for a directed verdict. See Br. Aplt. at 2, 
41-42. He also claims, however, that the preservation rule should not apply because his 
counsel "raised the affirmative defense of lack of intent." Br. Aplt. at 38. This assertion 
misconstrues the preservation requirement. 
Under the preservation rule, litigants may only raise claims before an appellate court 
if the claims were first raised in the trial court. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 11, 10 
P.3d 346. This rule requires a party to make a distinct, specific, and contemporaneous 
objection to a trial court's ruling before asserting a claim on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 
114 P,2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). Litigants generally must do this for every claim, 
including claims of insufficient evidence. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 16 ("[I]t is clear that 
as a general rule, a defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or 
objection to preserve the issue for appeal."). Where a litigant fails to properly preserve his 
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i > h | a 1 n u i I h e .ipi 'n lliiU' v m l I I U \ ''• u ' • "' i ' -v • M*4 ial 
circumstances, or ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Hansen, 2002 U T 114, J^ 21 
n.2,61P 3d 1062. 
Defendant .isserl.-i lh«:i( llii" pivscn jtiun nilc \liottli! mil apply in hi'i case bcunisi, lit 
put the court on notice that "the evidence was insufficient by asserting "the affirmative 
defense of lack of intent," Br. Aplt at 38, I le relies on the juv instructions on £ood faith 
and honest belief that his counsel proposed and W;L_. iic assort:. .;;,. UL, *...,.;\ ;v.jeoicu
 VK. 
evidence to the judge's 'attention "" Ur. Aplt. at 40 squotina Holgate, 2004 I" i " i * 




 >: ' : •! . . , •• \ rtionc r object •* " - :*:• 
ihe chum for appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, * io. Proposing ajury instruction is not .* nroper 
challenge to the evidence by motion or objection. If anything,, proposing ajury instruction is 
xTAv,icG\or, defendant's argument nhsperccives the standard for reviewing the 
suffi.cien.cy of the evidence supporting ajury verdict. The evidence of a defendant's guilt is 
findings of all required elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, 
J
 Defendant has not provided a record of the discussion between the pan to. aim .IK 
court regarding jury instructions. The notation on the proposed jury instruction, however, 
indicates that defendant withdrew the instruction rather than the court rejecting it (R. 213). 
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including the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, [the court] stops its inquiry 
and sustains] the verdict." State Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 185-86 (Utah 2000). Thus, the 
sufficiency of the evidence turns on the existence of competent evidence of each element of 
the crime, not the strength or weakness of defendant's contrary evidence. 
Thus, because defendant did not preserve his sufficiency claim in the trial court, and 
does not assert plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court should review his claim 
only under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21 
n.2. 
B. Under the correct definition of "willfully"—the definition used at 
trial—the evidence was sufficient; thus, counsel was not ineffective. 
To prove that he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, defendant must prove two elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or 
omissions he alleges fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,521 (Utah 
1994). Second "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. It is axiomatic, however, that the effective assistance standard 
does not require counsel to make futile motions and objections. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
41,^26, lP.3d 546. 
In the instant case, the evidence of defendant's willfulness was sufficient under the 
jury instructions defendant's trial counsel approved. Trial counsel was not, therefore, 
ineffective for choosing not to challenge the evidence of willfulness in his directed verdict 
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marshal the facts before this Court. • 
I Defendant has not marshaled the facts. 
Iliis Court should rejeu aciciiUani ^ .=.; . - .>,,. ,. .i, ;;i c\ idcn^c uu tne ground that 
|i
" h/". "nl proper1 <i iii,,ii>h1ihi| flic fads, A ilrfnidanl i\hn <i li i"!lnipes the snffic!',n|,v "film' 
evidence must first marshal all of the evidence supporting his conviction. See Utah .< 
P. 24(a)(9). The marshalling requirement arises from the considerable discretion appellate 
appellate court will overturn a jury verdict for lack of evidence only where "the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
convicted." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Ihe marshalling requirement properly places 
on defendant the burden of demonstrating how, under this highly deferential standard, the 
evidence is somenow msuiiiucni. 
: ' • - . . - • * inpellant to present. "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at "trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. After constructing Lns magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
cl la.llei iser i i mat fer i et c >iit a I kit al fla vv ill the e v idence " We " st \ \ tile) ; Cit) ; i > M 2 iestic Inv, 
Co.. - s K2.-1 i •" • I ^ 15 (Utah. App . 1991). Merely reviewing all the evidence before the 
fact l i ikkr is in.NUilicict'.i />. e Heinecke ^. <~/t// / <:; y.ommercc - • -
App, 1991 ) (finding that defendant fai • • . . • 
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"reviewed in minute detail all the evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what evidence 
actually supported the findings"). The challenger may not "simply provide an exhaustive 
review of all evidence presented at trial" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 11,100 P.3d 177. 
Rather, "[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. He must present "a precisely 
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings" he challenges. Chen, 2004 UT 
82, f 77. Failure to meet the marshaling burden is grounds to reject an attack on the 
sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., Chen, 2004 UT 82, % 80; State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, If 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
While defendant acknowledges his marshalling burden, see Br. Aplt. at 28, he never 
presents a single, unified compilation of all the facts supporting his guilt. His Statement of 
Facts weaves together inculpatory and exculpatory facts to present "an exhaustive review of 
all evidence presented at trial." Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 77. Defendant mixes facts probative of 
his conviction, such as his material omissions, with facts relevant to his defense of good 
faith, such as his own claim of ignorance of the fraudulent scheme. See Br. Aplt. at 16. He 
has thus left this Court to sift all the evidence at trial and find those facts on which the jury 
could have rested its guilty verdict. 
Defendant's recital of facts in his argument fares no better. He acknowledges his 
marshalling burden and admits that there was evidence that defendant performed no 
investigation of The Program even though he was aware that government agencies such as 
the FBI were investigating the legitimacy of The Program. See Br. Aplt. at 28-29. 
32 
Defendant then presents only evidence supportive of his good faith intentions. He describes 
the extensive investigation of some of the sellers, his own claim that he had no intent to do 
anything illegal, and his efforts to mitigate the victims' losses once The Program collapsed. 
See Br. Aplt. at 29-32. He does not consider any of the material omissions th ; • .^  State 
argued at trial, such as his own bankruptcy and Anderson felony conviction. 
Defendant cannot satisfy his marshalling burden by arguing facts that contradict the 
jury's verdict. The sifting and weighing of evidence is the exclusive responsibility of the 
jury. See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the evidence presented 
is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence."). Defendant's burden is to 
present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists," and then to "ferret 
out a fatal flaw." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. In other words, he must amass all the 
evidence that supports the jury's verdict and then explain what is missing, not \vhat is 
inconsistent or is contradicted by other evidence. 
Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should refuse to 
consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ j 80. Even 
if this Court were to excuse his failure to marshal, it should find that his counsel acted 
effectively, because the evidence was sufficient. 
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2. There was sufficient evidence that defendant willfully 
misrepresented the nature and safety of The Program. 
A party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a high burden. Courts "will 
not lightly overturn a jury verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 42, 994 P.2d 177; see 
also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (holding a defendant claiming 
insufficient evidence "faces a high hurdle in establishing this claim"). "This [C]ourt has 
limited authority to examine a jury verdict challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence." 
Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472. It must "view[ ] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict" and may reverse a jury verdict only if "the 
evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 18 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212); see also Scheel, 823 P.2d at 
472; Colwell 2000 UT 8, % 42; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344; State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 
123, 125 (Utah 1986); State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 875, 875 (Utah 1983) (holding that court 
may only reverse arson conviction if "reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt"). Thus, "[wjhen findings of all required elements 
of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it, [courts] stop their inquiry and sustain the verdict." Colwell, 2000 
UT8,^f42. 
In the instant case, the State presented evidence that during the purchase of the 
victims' homes and accompanying sale of an investment contract to the victims, defendant 
did not disclose the following facts to any of the victims: (1) his own bankruptcy; (2) 
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Anderson's felony conviction; (3) the risk that the managers of The Program might abscond 
with the trust funds; (4) the lawsuit filed against Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, L. Dale 
McAllister, and Paul Stewart; and (5) the cease-and-desist order issued against Paul Stewart 
(R. 412:107-08, 155, 191-92). He also did nut disclose to Sidney Creer that some of Van 
Roo's interest checks had bounced (R. 412:192). Defendant further affirmatively 
represented to each seller in the Placement Agreement that their money would remain in the 
trust account "unencumbered" (R 412:89; State's Ex No. 11,21,29). He also told Van Roo 
that he could "personally guarantee" that his money would be safe (R. 412:108). 
Defendant admitted at trial that he was aware of Anderson's felony conviction and of 
the risk that the managers of the Program might abscond with the funds (R. 413:352, 368). 
He also explained that 1 le i inderstood that Paul Stew art v\ oi lid I lse the m o n e y in the ti ust 
account to facilitate money transfers between banks (R. 413:371-72). Defendant denied 
knowing of the cease-and-desist order or the lawsuit, and the State presented no evidence 
that he knew of them (R. 413:369). The State did elicit testimony, however, that the lawsuit 
and the cease-and-desist order were public records that defendant could have easily 
discovered (R. 413:334, 369-70). 
The evidence of defendant's failure to disclose his bankruptcy, AnGci^n's felony 
conviction, and the risk of someone absconding with the trust funds was sufficient to permit 
the jury to infer that defendant willfully omitted to disclose material facts in connection with 
the sale of a security. Defendant was aware of each of these facts and knew that had had not 
disclosed them to Van Roo, Fernau, or Creer. That he did not know he was violating the 
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Utah Uniform Securities Act is irrelevant. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 
1993). 
The jury could also infer that defendant willfully misrepresented to the victims that 
the trust funds would remain unencumbered. While there is no evidence that defendant 
knew that Stewart and the others were looting the trust funds, the vague and conflicting 
descriptions of how The Program earned interest demonstrate that defendant understood that 
the trust funds would were at risk of loss. When Van Roo met with defendant and Anderson 
to discuss The Program, he asked how the trust account earned interest (R. 412:99). 
Anderson explained, "[W]hat we do is we can get loans based on this money that is in the 
escrow account and we can get better interest on that money that we're paying you and 
therefore we can pay you from the difference in that interest" (R. 412:99). Later, at trial, 
defendant explained that Stewart would use the funds to transfer money between banks and 
that he would earn a commission on the transfer from which he would pay the interest on the 
trust account (R. 413:372). 
However vague and conflicting these descriptions are, defendant was on notice that 
the trust account funds would be used as some form of collateral, bond, or other guarantee of 
performance that would put them at risk. Defendant cannot now bury his in the sand and 
claim that he didn't realize the funds would be encumbered, when his and Anderson's 
description of Stewart's activities demonstrated that, somehow, the funds must be 
encumbered or otherwise be at risk of loss. 
36 
The jury could also find a willful omission in defendant's failure to disclose to Creer 
that the some of Van Roo's checks had bounced (R. 412:192). Defendant knew that the 
checks were bouncing because he wrote personal checks to cover them, but he did not share 
this information with Creer when he explained J lie Program to her (R. 412:192; State's Ex. 
No. 19). 
Finally, the jury could infer a willful misrepresentation from defendant's assurance to 
Van Roo that he court "personally guarantee" that his money was safe (R 412:108). The 
trust account was managed by its escrow officei 1 1 )ale McAllister, and the title compati) 
attorney, Clay Harrison (R. 413:289-291). Defendant knew that he had no control or 
oversight of the trust account and that he could not, in fact, prevent the managers of the trust 
account from embezzling the money, thus, he i nnh I nol personal!} guarantee Ihe safe!) of 
Van Roo's money. 
Defendant claims that he did not understand that law imposed on him a duty to fully 
disclose the risks and liabilities of the security he was selling. Br. Aplt. at 3d 3 ' lie 
essentially argues that he made a mistake of law. Defendant's argument is foreclosed by the 
supreme court's holding in Larsen. "Willful does not require an intent to violate the law or 
to injure another or acquire any advantage." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3. It requires only 
an intent to "'engage in the conduct that cause[s] the result.'" Id. at 1358 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103). The State does not need to prove that 
defendant knew he had a duty to disclose, only that he didn't disclose. His claim that he 
acted in good faith is not a defense to criminal liability. See id. at 1360 n. 8. 
37 
Defendant's assertion is also foreclosed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (West 
2004), which states that mistake or ignorance of the law is not a defense to a crime, unless 
the mistake or ignorance is based upon an official statement of the law from an 
administrative agency, a court, or a public servant charged with responsibility for 
interpreting the law. Defendant does not claim that he relied on any official interpretation in 
deciding that he did not need to disclose his bankruptcy, Anderson's felony, or the risks of 
the investment. To the contrary, he admitted at trial and maintains on appeal that he 
performed no investigation (R. 413:372). Br. Aplt. at28. "[H]e was lured by the prospect of 
easy money and the promise of free homes" and "relied on others to investigate the 
legitimacy of the Program." Br. Aplt. at 28. His ignorance of the law is no defense to his act 
of selling a security without folly disclosing the nature and risks of the investment. 
Moreover, as explained supra point I.B.3, defendant's lack of investigation into the 
legitimacy of The Program does not excuse his failure to disclose the cease and desist order 
or the lawsuit. The signs of potential fraud were obvious. The FBI was investigating The 
Program; Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund refused to allow its name on the placement 
agreement; and the promised returns—more than 8.5%—were outrageous in light of the 
assurance that the trust funds would remain unencumbered. Additionally, each of the 
victims was extremely apprehensive about the investing in The Program, and each tried to 
investigate extensively before participating. Yet defendant, who had done no investigation, 
represented The Program as legitimate. Defendant's promotion of The Program, without 
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first checking for pending legal action against its principal architects or performing any < >1 her 
investigation, willfully misrepresented the nature and risks of The Program. 
3, Defendant willfully sold an unregistered security and willfully 
sold a security without a license. 
Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence that he willfully sob 
unregistered security and willfully sold a security without a license because the "record 
contains absolutely no evidence that [he] believed he was selling securities." Br. Aplt. at 33. 
He does not claim that the investment was not a security or that it was otherwise exempt 
from registration. Rather, as with his convictions for securities fraud, he claims that did not 
act willfully because he did not know the investment was a security. Br. Aplt. at 33. 
As with defendant's challenge to the definition of "willfully" in the securities fraud 
context, defendant cannot now claim ignorance of the law when he agreed below that 
ignorance is no defense. Even if this Court were to excuse defendant's waiver, however, it 
should still construe "willfully" in the context of registering and selling securities as it was 
defined in the trial court—because that is the correct definition. 
No Utah case has addressed the question of whether scienter is required to show 
willfulness in the context of selling unregistered securities or selling securities without a 
license. Most jurisdictions, however, have rejected arguments that scienter is required. See 
Bayhi v. State, 629 So.2d 782, 789 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) ("A specific criminal intent or 
guilty knowledge that the law is being violated is not required to find criminal violations of 
those sections of the Alabama Securities Act prohibiting the sale of unregistered 
securities."); State v. Andresen, 113 A.2d 328, 346 (Conn. 2001) (holding that reasonable 
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reliance on advice of attorney is no defense to sale of unregistered securities because crime 
"requires proof only that the defendant intended to do the act prohibited by the statute"); 
Clarkson v. State, 486 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ind. 1985) (upholding conviction for sale of 
unregistered securities and sale of securities without a license despite lack of evidence that 
defendant was aware of securities laws); State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100,103 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) ( holding that "'willful/ as specifically applied to Chapter 409 [of the Uniform 
Securities Act], means only that the act in question is intentional"); State v. Irons, 51A 
N.W.2d 144, 149-50 (Neb. 1998) ("Knowledge by a defendant that the item sold is a 
security is not required in order to convict under the registration provisions of the Uniform 
Securities Act."); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1,12-13 (N.D. 1981) ("We find persuasive the 
Federal and State court cases which have decided that proof of evil intent is not required to 
show a willful violation under similar provisions of securities laws."); State v. Sheets, 610 
P.2d 760,770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting contention that crime of selling unregistered 
security requires knowledge that item is a security). 
In the interests of uniformity, this Court should follow the reasoning of the rest of the 
nation and hold that "willfully," in the context of selling unregistered securities and selling 
securities without a license, requires only "an act which is intentional with regard to the 
conduct" and not an intent to violate securities laws. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d at 104. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (stating that securities act should be construed uniformly with other 
states); Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360 ("the mandate 'to make uniform' the law of the enacting 
states is unmistakable"). Defendant did not accidentally sell unregistered securities. He also 
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did not accidentally sell a securities without a license. Thus, his violations of the Securities 
Act were willful. 
C Defendant waived whatever claim of error he asserts in the 
prosecutor's closing argument 
The heading of sub point LC. in defendant's brief states, "The Prosecutor Erroneously 
Argued For A Mere Negligence Standard Contrary to Her Burden of Showing Knowing, 
Willful Cniuhu'l Br. Aplt. ;il VI Defendant does not, however, argue prosecutorial 
misconduct. Br. Aplt. at 34-36. Rather, he argues that negligence in failing to discover that 
a statement is false or misleading is not sufficient to find a willful misrepresentation. Br. 
Aplt. at 35. Defendant then argues that even under a negligence standard, the State failed to 
prove willfulness. Br. Aplt. at 35-36. 
The arguments in sub point LC. of defendant's brief largely repeat his earlier 
arguments and fail for reasons explained above. To the extent, if any, defendant asserts a 
claim oi Tosecutorial misconduct, the claim is wa i \ ired Defendant did i lot object to the 
prosecutor's argument (R. 414:424-29). He has not asserted that the argument was plainly 
erroneous or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Br. Aplt. at 34-36. 
Accordingly defendant has waived any claim of error. See State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UI App 
3, f 12 n.4, 63 P.3d 110 (refusing to consider robbery defendant's unpreserved claim that 
State never proved that he had purpose to deprive where defendant raised plain error for the 
first time in reply brief). 
Moreover, the prosecutor committed no misconduct because her argument was 
consistent with both the jury instructions and the case law in other jurisdictions construing 
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"willfully" in the context of securities fraud. See supra, pt. I.D.3. In order to demonstrate 
prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that "the actions or remarks of... counsel 
call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 42,57 P.3d 1139 (quotations 
omitted, alteration in original). The jury instructions only defined "willfully" as a 
"conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result" (R. 335). They 
said nothing about the level of awareness of the falsity or omission necessary to make an act 
willful. Thus, the prosecutor committed no error in arguing for a lesser standard of 
awareness than defendant now asserts for the first time on appeal. 
III. DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF 144 MONTHS OF PROBATION 
DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH LAW. 
Defendant claims that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it suspended 
his prison terms and placed him on probation for 144 months. Br. Aplt. at 43. He asserts 
that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (West 2004) limits probation to thirty-six months. 
Br. Aplt. at 44. He further asserts that the law does not permit a judge to impose consecutive 
terms of probation, but rather, limits the judge to one thirty-six-month term for all six of 
defendant's convictions. Br. Aplt. at 43-44. Defendant misinterprets the plain language of 
Utah's sentencing statutes. Those statutes do not limit probation to thirty-six-month terms.6 
Defendant did not object to the length of probation at sentencing (R. 415:11-14). 
This Court may, however, correct an illegal sentence at anytime. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Thus, if the trial court imposed a sentence "beyond the authorized statutory range," this 
Court may correct it, despite defendant's acquiescence to the 144-month term at sentencing. 
See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, \ 5 n.l, 48 P.3d 228. 
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{ Utah Lode Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) allows a (in ml niiii I lui mm (in IMP 
probation for longer than thirty-six months. 
Defendant correctly recognizes that "the plain language of statutes control the trial 
court's sentencing authority." Br. Aplt. at 43. A trial court's power "to giant, modify, or 
revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, 
the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith 
v. Cook, n> * P.2d 788, 791 (Utah I ^M)). See also State v. Green, 757 F2d 4o2, 46?> (Utah 
1988). Thus, whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) limits the term of probation a 
court may impose is purely a question of statutory interpretation 
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the 
Legislature's intent.'" State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The 
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute. 
Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883 
P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of the statute is clear, there is 
no need to look further. See Visitor Auth. Info. Cntr. V. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 
1196,1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no 
need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history."); Salt Lake Child & Family 
Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction."). \ i ^viewing court should not add oi subtract statutory terms. Reinkraut v. 
Shalala, 854 F.Supp. 838, 841 (D. Utah 1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the 
meaning of the statute from its very language, and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce 
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it according to its terms. Its words then bear 'their original meaning and the statute is not to 
be read so as to add or subtract from [that] which is stated... '" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 
89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
The power of a trial court to suspend a sentence and impose probation is found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2). That subsection states that "the court may, after imposing 
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a). It does not, however, provide a minimum or maximum time 
limit for which a court may keep a defendant on probation. 
Defendant asserts that this limit is found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). Br. 
Aplt. at 44. He claims that subsection prohibits courts from setting a probation term of 
longer than thirty-six months. Br. Aplt. at 44. Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) states, "Probation 
may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without 
violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in 
cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
(emphasis added). 
By its plain language, section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) is permissive, not restrictive. The 
primary legal sense of the word "may" is: "Is permitted to." Black's Law Dictionary 443 
(2d. Pocket Ed. 2001). Utah courts have consistently construed the word "may" as 
permissive or discretionary. See Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, If 25,48 P.3d 895 
("The plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the word "may" is "'permissive' or 
'discretionary,'" generally indicating that an individual is either 'permitted' or 'has a 
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possibility' to do something." (quoting Blackfs Law Dictionary 993 (7th ed. 1999)).); Evans 
v. Bd. Of County Comm srs, 2004 UT App 256, ^ 20, 97 P.3d 697 (citing case in which Utah 
courts have construed "may" as permissive). "[T]he word 'may' imports permission, 
privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of opporti iiil1:> or power It Is ne\ er pi operly 
used in a denial, a restriction, or a limitation, except in connection with the word 'not.'" 
State v. Mclntyre, 66 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1937). 
Defendant relies on State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 ( [ Jtah 1988), for his assertion tl lat 
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) prohibits felony probation terms longer than thirty-six months. 
Green is inapposite, however, because it was decided under a different version section 77-
18-l(10)(a)(i). At the time Green was decided, the statute stated, "'Upon completion 
without violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six 
months in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence and 
the supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court'" Green, 757 P.2d at 464 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 7 7-18 1 (1 ())(a) (Interii n. Supp. 
1984)). The Green court noted that the word "shall" was a "strong mandate." Id. It went on 
to hold that the statute automatically terminated probation after eighteen months. Id at 464-
65. 
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In its first session after the Green decision, the legislature rewrote section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) and replaced the word "shall" with the word "may.55 See 1989 Laws of Utah ch. 
226 § 1,77-18-1 (7)(a).7 It also changed the eighteen-month period to thirty-six months. Id. 
The shift from "shall" to "may" following the Green decision is significant. The word 
"shall" "is 'usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this 
and other jurisdictions.'" Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, f 13, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
(quoting Bd ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983)). The word 
"may" on the other hand, "imports permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a 
grant of opportunity or power." Mclntyre, 66 P.2d at 881. By replacing "shall" with "may" 
the legislature signaled its intent that the statutory period is permissive rather than a "strong 
mandate." 
Three cases since the 1989 amendment have described section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) as 
fixing a maximum formal probation period. See State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, ^  11, 980 P.2d 
201; State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, ^  19, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 7; State v. Robinson, 
860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1993). None of those cases, however, directly addressed the 
question of whether section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) imposes a maximum period of probation. Call 
considered the question of what the State must do to notify the offender of a probation 
violation in order to extend probation before it terminates. See Call, 1999 UT 42, Tf 8. 
McDonald confronted the question of whether a trial court's sentence of two years formal 
n 
At that time, subsection (10)(a) had been recodified as subsection (7)(a). 
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probation followed by twelve and one-half years of informal pi obation for con\ ictions for 
fifty-eight class C misdemeanors, could be construed as fifty-eight ninety-day periods of 
probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, fflf 17-18. Robinson questioned whether a trial 
court could enter a restitution order that placed R obinsononpi obation until he fully paid his 
restitution. See Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983. In all three cases, the courts assumed without 
analysis that the probation terms in section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) were maximum limits. As the 
question before this Court was not directly addressed by the court in those cases, they are of 
little precedential value in resolving the instant case. 
Even if this Court were to construe section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) as the Green court 
construed its predecessor, i.e. as automatically terminating probation at the end of the 
statutory period, it does not follow that the statute sets a maximi iiii period of probation. 
Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) permits termination of probation at thirty-six months only "upon 
completion without violation." By its plain terms, the statute is not activated until the felony 
offender successfully completes thirty-six i nonths of pi obation. Nothing in the statute 
prevents the court from anticipating that an offender will require longer than thirty-six 
months to complete all the terms of his probation and setting the term accordingly. If the 
offender does manage to complete the terms of his probation within the thirty-six month 
period, the longer term at sentencing becomes of no effect because the court must, under the 
statute, terminate his probation. 
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Inasmuch as defendant has not yet completed thirty-six months of probation without a 
violation, it is premature for him to invoke section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) to limit the term of his 
probation. 
B. A trial court may impose consecutive terms of probation. 
Even if this Court construes Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(10)(a)(i) as prohibiting 
probation terms longer than thirty-six months, it should still uphold defendant's sentence 
because the 144-month term is actually six consecutive twenty-four month terms. Whether a 
court may impose consecutive probation terms is an issue of first impression in Utah. 
As a threshold question, this Court must first determine that the judge actually 
imposed consecutive probation terms. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, ^ f 21. To impose 
consecutive terms, the judge must "clearly determine the probation period for each offense 
and explicitly state that the terms are to run consecutively." Id. 
At sentencing, the trial judge imposed suspended consecutive prison terms (R. 
415:11). He then stated his intention to set probation for "a lot longer" than thirty-six 
months and asked, "How far can I set it with six consecutive felonies?" (R. 415:11). An 
unidentified person claimed that the court could only set probation for thirty-six months (R. 
415:11). The judge responded, "Currently on each one?" (R. 415:11). The prosecutor then 
pointed out that Clay Harrison was on probation for twelve years (R. 415:11). The judge 
then said, "That's what I'm inclined to do in this particular case as well. Place you on 
probation for a period of 144-months, a 12-year period" (R. 415:11). 
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The only reasonable interpretation of the sentence is that the judge intended to impose 
consecutive probation terms. He stated his intention to impose a lengthy probation. The 
unidentified speaker pointed out, and the judge appeared to agree, that felony probation is 
limited to thirty-six months. The judge then imposed a 144-month term. Ifthejudgedidnot 
intend to impose consecutive probation terms, then, in his own mind, he imposed a single 
144-month term in violation of the thirty-six month limit claimed by the unidentified 
speaker. It's unreasonable to assume that the judge believed he was imposing an illegal 
sentence. Thus, the 144-nimilh piolution Uini must be six terms of twenty-four months. 
Consecutive terms of probation are permissible under the plain language of Utah's 
sentencing laws. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) authorizes a court "to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences." Pmktlion is listed as a possible "sentence" in Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-3-201 (West 2004). There is nothing ambiguous or unclear about the 
legislature's use of the word "sentence" in sections 201 and 401. Absent any ambiguity, this 
Court should rely in the plain meaning of the statutes to divine the legislatures intent. Salt 
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) 
("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and 
no room is left for construction."). Thus, section 76-3-401 permits a court to impose 
concurrent or consecutive probation terms, and defendant's sentence is legal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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§ 6 1 - 1 - 1 . Fraud unlawful 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Addendum B 
§ 61 -1 - 3 , Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a broker-
dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter. 
(2)(a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an 
agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective 
during any period when he is not associated with a particular broker-dealer 
licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer. 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a broker-dealer 
or issuer, or begins or terminates those activities which make him an agent, 
the agent as well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify the 
division. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as an 
investment adviser or as an investment adviser representative unless: 
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment companies as 
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940,1 other investment advisers, 
federal covered advisers, broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and 
loan associations, insurance companies, employee benefit plans with assets of 
not less than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies or instrumentalities, 
whether acting for themselves or as trustees with investment control, or other 
institutional investors as are designated by rule or order of the director; or 
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and during the 
preceding 12-month period has had not more than five clients, other than 
those specified in Subsection (3)(b), who are residents of this state. 
(4)(a) It is unlawful for any: 
(i) person required to be licensed as an investment adviser under this 
chapter to employ an investment adviser representative unless the invest-
ment adviser representative is licensed under this chapter, provided that 
the license of an investment adviser representative is not effective during 
any period when the person is not employed by an investment adviser 
licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or associate with an 
investment adviser representative having a place of business located in this 
state, unless such investment adviser representative is licensed under this 
chapter or is exempt from licensing. 
(b) When an investment adviser representative required to be licensed 
under this chapter begins or terminates employment with an investment 
adviser, the investment adviser shall promptly notify the division. 
(5) Except with respect to investment advisers whose only clients are those 
described under Subsections (3)(b) or (3)(c), it is unlawful for any federal 
covered adviser to conduct advisory business in this state unless such person 
complies with the provisions of Section 61-1-4. 
Addendum C 
§ 61-1—7. Registration before sale 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it 
is registered under this chapter, the security or transaction is exempted under 
Section 61-1-14, or the security is a federal covered security for which a notice 
filing has been made pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-1-15.5. 
Addendum D 
§ 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 . Penalties for violations 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who willfully 
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was commit-
ted, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be 
obtained was worth less than $10,000; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; 
or 
(ii)(A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or 
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than 
$10,000; and 
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(I) equity in a person's home; 
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in 
the Internal Revenue Code;1 or 
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; 
and 
(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(A) equity in a person's home; 
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he 
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, 
the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy provided for in 
Subsection 6l-l-20(2)(b). 
Addendum E 
§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality— 
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or exten-
sion—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investiga-
tion standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards 
shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to 
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis 
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modi-
fications to the standards based upon criteria in Subjection (3)(a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence 
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the* 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement 
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the depart-
ment regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as 'provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investiga-
tion report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be 
waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32ar, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by 
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including 
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certifi-
cate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance 
with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemean-
ors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdic-
tion of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the 
registry* of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and 
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of 
State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of 
court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and com-
plete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert-
ed to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five^days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecut-
ing attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that:> 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the 
state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priori-
ty for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic eval-
uations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Gov-
ernment Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency ^approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that 
the disclosure to the victim shall include pnly information relating to state-
ments or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime 
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the 
victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of proba-
tion under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to 
the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropri-
ate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, 
it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Depart-
ment of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confine-
ment to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
